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We give new arguments in support of signed quantum key establish-
ment, where quantum cryptography is used in a public-key infrastruc-
ture that provides the required authentication. We also analyze more
thoroughly than previous works the benefits that quantum key estab-
lishment protocols have over certain classical protocols, motivated in
part by the various objections to quantum key establishment that are
sometimes raised. Previous knowledge of quantum cryptography on
the reader’s part is not required for this article, as the definition of
“quantum key establishment” that we use is an entirely classical and
black-box characterization (one need only trust that protocols satisfy-
ing the definition exist).
Quantum cryptography1 has been promoted as a more secure alterna-
tive to public-key cryptography based on computational assumptions (see
the abstract of Ref. [1] for a typical example). However, an opposing view
is sometimes voiced by classical cryptographers and computer security spe-
cialists questioning whether quantum cryptography is really a practical way
to achieve security against quantum computers, also known as quantum re-
sistance. Several detailed analyses have appeared that consider the benefits
and disadvantages of quantum cryptography in comparison to classical alter-
natives [2, 3, 4, 5]. The present article contributes to the dialogue in a way
that we hope is very palatable to the community of quantum-questioning
cryptographers: we give new arguments in support of signed quantum key
establishment, where quantum cryptography is used in a public-key infras-
tructure that provides the required authentication.
We also analyze more thoroughly than previous works the benefits that
quantum key establishment (qke) protocols have over certain classical pro-
1Note that quantum cryptography includes many protocols that this paper does not
discuss. We use the term “quantum cryptography” here as a synonym for “quantum key
establishment”, often called “quantum key distribution” or “qkd”.
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tocols, motivated in part by the various objections to qke that have been
put forward (for example, in Ref. [5]). Some of those objections follow.2
• Objection 1: Quantum computers are not known to be able to break
all classical public-key cryptosystems, such as the McEliece cryptosys-
tem or those based on lattice problems; so we can just upgrade to these
quantum-resistant cryptosystems and forget quantum cryptography—
that way, we’d retain all the benefits of a public-key infrastructure.
• Objection 2: If all of classical public-key cryptography is found to
be easily breakable, then we might as well revert to using our best
symmetric-key cryptography, including block ciphers like aes, which
we all agree is quantum resistant; quantum cryptography would require
symmetric shared initial keys anyway in this case, so it wouldn’t gain
us anything.
• Objection 3: We don’t need any means of key distribution, let alone
a quantum mechanical one—let’s just exchange a lifetime’s worth of
symmetric keying material at the start. If for whatever reason we do
need new keys, see Objection 4.
• Objection 4: We don’t need any means of generating independent se-
cret key over telecommunication links—let’s just use a trusted courier
each time we need independent secret key.
We address all of these objections.
Not quantum cryptography again. Like in pro-quantum-cryptography
articles that have come before this, we assume here that the universe is
quantum mechanical, so that, at a minimum, the secret key generated by
a secure key-establishment protocol must be secure against an adversary
able to perform probabilistic-polynomial-time computations on a quantum
computer. As well, as stated by Stebila et al. [4], we “expect the costs and
challenges of using [qke] to decrease to the point where [such] systems can
be deployed affordably and their behaviour can be certified.” In fact, most
of the advantages of quantum cryptography that we point out here have
been noted by Paterson et al. [2] or Stebila et al. [4].
Despite these similarities to previous works, our analysis contains dis-
tinct new features: it
2We have stated these objections in our own words.
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• suggests a new way to define the classes of classical and qke protocols,
in order to aid their comparison,
• deals properly with the option of using trusted couriers instead of qke,
by distinguishing between in-band and out-of-band actions,
• uses the weakest possible notion of “security” in a quantum universe
(i.e. computational security), and therefore does not focus on information-
theoretic security—for its own sake—as an advantage of qke over
computationally-secure classical alternatives,
• provides a finer-grained analysis of the computational assumptions
underlying the classical alternatives to qke,
• highlights a property (we call it “nonattributability”) of qke that has
received little attention in the literature, and
• supports a recommendation that is both theoretically and practically
sound, which both sides of the “quantum debate” can agree upon.
Generally, we hope the reader finds this article to benefit from a more precise
cryptographic analysis, despite its more limited scope in taking an idealized
view and thus not discussing the more technological or economical aspects of
qke (including side-channel attacks). In other words, this paper studies the
value of the qke primitive assuming it is available in practice and is as cost-
effective as any type of “in-band” classical key establishment (see Definition
1).3 We adopt the same foundational approach that Goldreich does in Refs.
[7, 8]. This basically means that, when reviewing which computational as-
sumptions are known to be necessary or sufficient for certain cryptographic
primitives, we ignore those assumptions (and the schemes based on them)
that are ad hoc: we deal only in fundamental computational assumptions,
in particular, one-way functions and trapdoor predicates.
But the foregoing analysis is not as complete as it could be. In particu-
lar, we do not treat the distributed authenticated key establishment problem
3 The practical availability of the qke primitive between a typical real-world Alice and
Bob is a very non-trivial assumption. For a fairly recent status report on practical qke
systems, one can see Ref. [6], where it is evident that key-rate, distance and availability
remain serious obstacles for most practical applications today. In the cases that one
believes that qke could in principle add value, one will need to do an in depth analysis
of the various costs and practical limitations before deciding whether in some particular
practical situation qke will be the preferred alternative. Weighing the costs against the
value depends on many parameters which vary widely from place to place and over time,
and analyzing this broad spectrum is beyond the scope of this paper.
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(i.e., in a network setting and where simultaneous, multiple key establish-
ment sessions among many pairs of users are considered) as rigorously as it
deserves (e.g. [9, 10]). That is, we implicitly assume that point-to-point4
unauthenticated key establishment protocols (whether they be key trans-
port protocols or key agreement protocols5) and message-authentication
protocols (whether they be digital signature schemes or message authen-
tication codes) may be combined in such a way as to form robust dis-
tributed authenticated key establishment protocols, without stating the de-
tails of how this combining—especially with regard to authentication—
actually works.6 This deficiency is manifest in the definition of “security”
that we use (Definition 2): it only refers to privacy of the secret key and not
its integrity; we take authentication in a network-setting for granted (for
both classical and quantum networks). Thus, analyzing point-to-point key
establishment systems is sufficient for our scope and, for such systems, in-
tegrity of the established secret key is obtained either by assumption (in the
case of unauthenticated key establishment) or by the message-authentication
protocols used to authenticate the classical communication channel (in the
case of authenticated key establishment). Our omission of the analysis of
distributed qke in no way is meant to imply that the problem is trivial—we
believe it is an important open problem, which to our knowledge has not
been addressed in any previous works.
As a final note to the reader, we stress that previous knowledge of quan-
tum cryptography is not required for this article. The definition of “qke”
that we use is an entirely classical and black-box characterization (one need
only trust that protocols satisfying the definition exist).
Key establishment. We are ultimately interested in authenticated key
establishment (or ake), since, in practice, it is usually not a reasonable
4By “point-to-point” protocols or key establishment systems we mean those that pre-
sume a unique pair of honest participants in the protocol; in other words, Alice and Bob
are fixed.
5Recall that a key transport protocol is a key establishment protocol where the final
secret key is generated by one party and sent to the other party (using some kind of
encryption mechanism). By contrast, a key agreement protocol is a key establishment
protocol where both parties contribute to the generation of the final secret key. See Ref.
[11] for more details.
6We follow Ref. [11] in our use of the terms “authenticated (key establishment)” and
“unauthenticated (key establishment)”. In this convention, the word “(un)authenticated”
describes the guaranteed condition of the final shared key resulting from the protocol. We
note that this convention is the opposite of that in Ref. [8], where “(un)authenticated”
describes the a priori assumption on the (classical) communication channel used in the
protocol.
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assumption that the classical channel connecting Alice and Bob is authenti-
cated a priori. But we shall also consider unauthenticated key establishment
(or uke), because, as well as being useful as a building block for ake sys-
tems, it is an often-considered cryptographic primitive in more foundational
works, e.g., Ref. [12] (see Remark 2). We now make some precise definitions.
A (point-to-point) ake system consists of two probabilistic-polynomial-
time (quantum) computers, called “Alice” and “Bob”, that
• are preloaded with classical initial keys, kA (stored on Alice) and kB
(stored on Bob), which are pre-distributed out of band (see Definition
1) in an authenticated and, where necessary (for example, when the
keys are symmetric), private fashion, and
• are connected by two insecure channels, one quantum and one classi-
cal, variously monitored or controlled by an adversarial probabilistic-
polynomial-time (quantum) computer, called “Eve”, and
• together execute a particular (point-to-point) ake protocol, the spec-
ification π of which is preloaded authentically but is not secret, and
• which results in Alice and Bob computing outputs sA and sB , respec-
tively, such that either sA = sB = ⊥, which corresponds to Alice and
Bob aborting the protocol, or sA and sB are bit-strings, in which case,
if sA = sB, then the secret key s := sA is defined.
When the initial keys are symmetric (kA = kB), we may use k to denote
each one, i.e., k = kA = kB ; if the initial keys are asymmetric (kA 6= kB),
then
kA = (xA, yB) (1)
kB = (xB , yA), (2)
where (xA, yA) is Alice’s private-public key-pair and (xB , yB) is Bob’s private-
public key-pair. We will say more about asymmetric (public-key) cryptog-
raphy later on.
Definition 1 (In band/out of band). The term “in band” describes actions
carried out in the normal course of telecommunications strictly via remote
signalling across communication channels. The term “out of band” is used
to mean “not in band” and describes communication via non-digital/manual
means as opposed to via standard telecommunication devices.
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Remark 1 (Classical channel). Strictly speaking, there is no need for a
dedicated classical channel between Alice and Bob, since classical informa-
tion can be sent along the quantum channel. However, the well-known qke
protocols (i.e., those based on the ones in Refs [13, 14]) clearly distinguish
the classical from the quantum communication; in particular, it suffices that
only the classical communication is authenticated in order for the secret key
to be authenticated at the end of the protocol (whereas, one could imagine
a quantum protocol where the quantum communication also needs to be au-
thenticated). In line with this distinction, we assume separate quantum and
classical channels.
A (point-to-point) uke system is defined similarly to an ake system,
with only the following differences:
• Alice and Bob possess no initial keys and
• the classical channel is assumed to be authenticated, i.e., Eve is as-
sumed only to passively monitor the classical channel (but she can still
totally control the quantum channel), and
• π is a (point-to-point) uke protocol.
We also need to define conditions under which a key establishment proto-
col is secure or, more specifically, quantum-resistant. We would like a defini-
tion that applies equally well to both quantum and fully classical protocols,
i.e., all protocols allowed in the above frameworks. Since we take authenti-
cation for granted (as explained above), the following security definition is
sufficient for both ake and uke systems. Call a key establishment protocol
perfectly secure if, for any algorithm for Eve, we have that (1) sA = sB, (2)
if sA 6= ⊥ then sA is uniformly distributed and independent of Eve’s state,
and (3) if Eve does not interfere with the protocol (where we assume oth-
erwise perfect channels), then sA 6= ⊥. Let I be an ideal key establishment
system that implements a perfectly secure protocol. Let R(π) be a real key
establishment system that uses protocol π. Let n be the minimum length
of the secret key s if Alice and Bob do not abort. Consider a probabilistic-
polynomial-time (quantum) distinguisher running in time polynomial in n,
that interacts with either I or R(π) and then outputs a guess bit B; the
distinguisher has access to Eve’s system and the outputs sA and sB .
Definition 2 (Quantum-resistant key-establishment protocol (with respect
to privacy)). Assuming the above definitions, a point-to-point key-establishment
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protocol π is quantum-resistant (with respect to privacy) if, for any such dis-
tinguisher, the quantity
|Pr[B = 1|I]− Pr[B = 1|R(π)]| (3)
is negligible for all sufficiently large n, where Pr[B = 1|I] and Pr[B =
1|R(π)] are the probabilities that B = 1 when the distinguisher interacts
with I and R(π), respectively.
We give this (semi-formal) definition for completeness; we refer the reader
to Refs [15, 16, 7, 17] for how to rigorize such a definition.
As a final specification of our basic setup, it will be helpful to define
the classical communication c in a key establishment protocol. For classi-
cal protocols, the classical communication is all the communication between
Alice and Bob. For arbitrary (quantum) protocols, defining the classical
communication is a bit more subtle; we refrain from giving a formal defini-
tion here (for the sake of the reader who may be unfamiliar with quantum
measurement). Rather, for the quantum protocols we care about, it suffices
to define the classical communication tautologically as the classical commu-
nication specified in the protocol, since these protocols clearly and naturally
distinguish the classical and quantum information sent between Alice and
Bob.
The contenders. Below are listed and defined two main classes of point-
to-point uke protocols as well as the five main classes of point-to-point ake
protocols that are considered in the literature when evaluating the useful-
ness of quantum cryptography in comparison to classical techniques for key
establishment. These classes, as defined, do not cover all conceivable pro-
tocols, but do cover all the ones that are usually considered (which suffices
here). In defining these classes, we restrict to quantum-resistant protocols
(because the universe is quantum). It will help to view the quantities kA,
kB , k, s, and c introduced above as random variables. For example, in the
case of symmetric initial keys, the quantity k may be viewed as a uniformly
distributed random variable in {0, 1}ℓ, for some fixed ℓ ∈ Z>0 that deter-
mines the length of the initial keys.
Unauthenticated key establishment protocols:
• Classical uke (c-UKE)—This class includes any quantum-resistant
and totally classical uke protocol. It includes unauthenticated key
transport protocols based on public-key encryption (but not those
based on symmetric-key encryption).
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• Quantum uke (q-UKE)—This class includes any quantum-resistant
uke protocol such that, whenever Eve has not interfered with the
protocol, the secret key s is independent of the classical communication
c, i.e., for all values c′ of the classical communication and all values s′
of the secret key,
Pr[s = s′|c = c′] = Pr[s = s′]. (4)
It includes the well-known qke protocols and can easily be shown not
to include any classical protocols.7
Remark 2 (Secret key agreement). The cryptographic primitive realized
by protocols in c-UKE is usually referred to as secret key agreement (or
sometimes just secret agreement) in the literature. Note that this primitive
is also realized by protocols in q-UKE.
Authenticated key establishment protocols:
• Out-of-band key establishment (OOB)—This class includes any ake
protocol where Alice and Bob are preloaded with the secret key out of
band, i.e.,
s = kA = kB . (5)
It includes protocols that employ a trusted courier. The initial keys in
such protocols are typically much larger than in protocols belonging
to the classes below.
• Pseudorandom generator expansion (PGE)—This class includes any
quantum-resistant and totally classical ake protocol not in OOB that
uses symmetric initial keys where Alice and Bob establish a secret key
that is efficiently computable from the initial keys, i.e., there exists a
deterministic-polynomial-time classical algorithm A such that
s = A(π, k). (6)
7We sketch a proof of the latter fact that no purely classical protocol can be quantum
resistant and satisfy (4). Let rA and rB be binary strings encoding the private local
randomness that Alice and Bob respectively use in the protocol. Consider the sequence
c1, c2, . . . of messages passed between Alice and Bob. Each ci places constraints on the
values of rA and rB. Since, at the end of the protocol, the secret key s is uniquely
determined, it must be that rA and rB are determined by the classical communication c
up to implying a unique s, i.e., H(s|c) = 0, where H is the Shannon entropy. For any two
random variables X and Y , H(X|Y ) = H(X) if and only if X and Y are independent
[18]. Therefore, if (4) holds, then H(s) = H(s|c) = 0, so that s is a constant and thus the
protocol is not quantum resistant.
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It includes protocols that use a pseudorandom generator to expand
the initial keys into a secret key.
• Weak classical ake (wc-AKE)—This class includes any quantum-resistant
and totally classical ake protocol in neither PGE nor OOB that uses
symmetric initial keys. Note such protocols have the property that the
secret key is efficiently computable from the initial keys and the com-
munication, i.e., there exists a deterministic-polynomial-time classical
algorithm A such that
s = A(π, k, c). (7)
The class includes authenticated key transport protocols based on
symmetric-key encryption.
• Strong8 classical ake (sc-AKE)—This class includes any quantum-
resistant and totally classical ake protocol, where Alice and Bob estab-
lish an authenticated secret key s that is not functionally dependent on
the initial keys kA and kB , i.e., there exists a deterministic-polynomial-
time classical algorithm A such that
s = A(π, rA, rB), (8)
where rA and rB are (random variables representing) the private local
random choices of Alice and Bob respectively (made independently
of the initial keys). It includes authenticated key transport protocols
based on public-key encryption (but not those based on symmetric-key
encryption); more generally, it includes the “authenticated version” of
any quantum-resistant uke protocol, where the initial keys are used
(only) to authenticate all the communication of the protocol (see Re-
mark 7).
• Quantum ake (q-AKE)—This class includes any quantum-resistant
ake protocol such that, whenever Eve has not interfered with the
protocol, the secret key s is independent of the initial keys and the
classical communication c, i.e., for all values k′
A
and k′
B
of the initial
8Our use of the word “strong” differs from that in Ref. [19], where a key establishment
protocol is secure only if it remains secure under the reveal of any subset of the initial
(also called “long-term”) and ephemeral keys that does not contain both the initial and
ephemeral keys of one of the parties. The protocols of the class we define here need only
remain secure under the reveal of the initial keys. Indeed, the “strong” of Ref. [19] is
stronger than ours.
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keys and all values c′ of the classical communication and all values s′
of the secret key,
Pr[s = s′|kA = k
′
A, kB = k
′
B , c = c
′] = Pr[s = s′]. (9)
It includes the authenticated version of the well-known qke protocols
and can easily be shown not to include any classical protocols (similarly
to the class q-UKE, defined previously).
Remark 3 (Possible emptiness of classical classes). Of the classes of in-
band key establishment protocols, only q-UKE and q-AKE are known to be
nonempty.
Remark 4 (Key pre-distribution v. dynamic key establishment). The union
of the classes OOB and PGE contains protocols referred to collectively as
key pre-distribution schemes [11], which is why we label these two classes
differently. Note that there is no need to authenticate the in-band commu-
nication in these protocols because there is none. Protocols that are not key
pre-distribution schemes are said to accomplish dynamic key establishment.
Remark 5 (Definition of sc-AKE). The class sc-AKE may contain protocols
that use the “quantum public-key cryptosystems” in Ref. [20], since the
model does not stipulate how initial keys are derived (i.e., they could be
derived using a quantum computer).
Remark 6 (Definition of q-AKE). The class q-AKE may contain protocols
obeying physical theories other than quantum theory.
Remark 7 (uke implies ake). Note that if π is in c-UKE, then π naturally
gives rise to a protocol in sc-AKE when combined with a secure classical
message-authentication protocol. A similar statement holds for q-UKE and
q-AKE.
We subdivide the classes sc-AKE and q-AKE by the type of initial
keys—either symmetric or public—used in the particular key establishment
protocol, i.e., we have the following disjoint unions
sc-AKE = sc-AKEsym ∪ sc-AKEpub (10)
q-AKE = q-AKEsym ∪ q-AKEpub. (11)
Table 1 summarizes the different classes by the various categories.
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uke ake
key pre-distribution - OOB out-of-band
- PGE in-band
dynamic - wc-AKE
key establishment c-UKE sc-AKE
q-UKE q-AKE
Table 1: The different classes of key establishment protocols.
Apples and Oranges. The class OOB is included in the above list (and
in the following analysis) largely for completeness; it is not technically con-
sidered a key establishment protocol. Out-of-band protocols for key estab-
lishment need not employ any fundamental cryptographic primitives and
cannot provide the same essential functionality that in-band protocols do,
i.e., generating new secret key in band. The generally accepted view is that
out-of-band key establishment is the most secure way to establish potentially
very long secret keys, but that well-implemented in-band protocols typically
provide either a more feasible solution in particular applications or a more
cost-effective solution in the long term. Because we are making the (reason-
able) assumption that qke will be cost-effective in the future, it reasonably
follows that, in at least some cases, it will also be more cost-effective than
out-of-band key establishment in the future. We mean to challenge here
previous comments made by Bernstein [5], that trusted couriers perform
equally as well as qke systems insofar as their ability to generate entropy
in the cryptographic system (from Eve’s point of view). The distinction
between in-band and out-of-band entropy generation is an important one
(cost-wise), and it is impossible to generate entropy in band using classical
cryptography alone.
Computational assumptions. We would like to closely examine the fun-
damental computational assumptions that underlie the various kinds of key
establishment protocols. To do this, we start by recalling the following well-
known theorems.9
9The following theorems and other similar statements should be interpreted as follows.
A statement of the form “Cryptographic objects of type Y exist if cryptographic objects
of type X exist” means “If there exists an object of type X, then there exists an object of
type Y such that breaking the object of type Y implies breaking the object of type X.”
Such a statement may also be phrased, “X implies Y ”.
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Theorem 8 ([7]). Pseudorandom generators exist if and only if one-way
functions exist.
Theorem 9 ([8]). Symmetric-key encryption schemes exist if and only if
one-way functions exist.
Theorem 10 ([21]). Public-key encryption schemes exist if and only if trap-
door predicates exist.
Theorem 11 ([22]). Information-theoretically-secure symmetric-key mes-
sage authentication codes exist.
Theorem 12 ([23, 24]). Public-key signature schemes exist if and only if
one-way functions exist.
Theorem 13 ([25]). Information-theoretically-secure q-UKE-protocols exist.
Because we are assuming a quantum universe, one-way functions and trap-
door predicates10 in this article (if they exist) are secure against an adversary
with a quantum computer, but are still assumed to be efficiently computable
on a classical computer; also, trapdoors are still considered to be classical
objects.11 We also note that Theorems 8, 9, 10, and 12 hold with respect to
black-box reductions: if the theorem states that X implies Y , then Y can be
constructed from X, only using X as a black box, i.e., the reduction does
not rely on the specifics of how X works; furthermore, the security reduction
is also a black-box one, i.e., an algorithm for breaking X can be constructed
from a black box for breaking Y . Non-black-box theorems of this sort are
also possible (for example, see Ref. [27]), but are rarely required for these
kinds of results, and indeed are not required for the theorems we quote. This
is lucky, since it guarantees us that the theorems still hold with respect to
a quantum universe.
The theorems establish the minimal fundamental computational assump-
tions known to be sufficient for the existence of protocols by class, sum-
marized in Table 2. Public-key encryption implies one-way functions [8].
10Informally, the predicate B(x) ∈ {0, 1} is a(n) (unapproximable) trapdoor predicate if
anyone can find an x such that B(x) = 0 or a y such that B(y) = 1 efficiently on a classical
computer, but only one who knows the trapdoor can, given z, compute B(z) efficiently
on a quantum computer (this notion was introduced in Ref. [21]). Note that one can use
a trapdoor predicate for public-key encryption: the bit b is encrypted as any x such that
B(x) = b.
11One could consider “one-way/trapdoor quantum functions”, where the input and
output of the functions are classical or quantum, and the functions only need to be com-
putable efficiently on a quantum computer. We stick to classical one-way functions and
trapdoor predicates that are quantum resistant, candidates of which are, e.g., the trapdoor
predicates underlying some lattice-based cryptosystems (see Ref. [26] for more examples).
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Protocol class Computational assumptions
OOB none
PGE one-way functions
wc-AKE one-way functions
c-UKE/sc-AKE trapdoor predicates
q-UKE/q-AKEsym none
q-AKEpub one-way functions
Table 2: Minimal known fundamental computational assumptions sufficient
for the existence of key establishment protocols in each class.
Thus, the classes c-UKE and sc-AKE require the strongest assumption in
the table—the existence of trapdoor predicates—which reflects the fact that
it is not known how to construct any protocol in these classes without re-
lying on (or implying) public-key encryption.12 To facilitate our discussion,
we summarize this point as the following conjecture:
Conjecture 14 (Classical secret key agreement implies public-key encryp-
tion). Every protocol in c-UKE implies a trapdoor predicate (with respect to
a possibly-non-black-box reduction).
Safest fair comparison. Most articles on quantum cryptography that
appeared in the 1990s and early 2000s stressed the fact that q-AKEsym (re-
spectively, q-UKE) is the only known class of in-band ake (respectively,
uke) protocols that requires no computational assumptions. But implicitly
discarding all computational assumptions in this way makes it impossible to
have a serious discussion about the relative merits of classical and quantum
protocols for key establishment (since any classical key-establishment proto-
col requires some computational assumption). So, suppose we give classical
cryptography a fighting chance: suppose we allow only the weakest compu-
tational assumption necessary for in-band classical key establishment—one-
way functions.
There is good reason to do this. Trapdoor predicates seem to be in-
herently less secure than one-way functions in general. Firstly, trapdoor
12One might declare Table 2 misleading, since, for example, Theorem 12 is usually
regarded merely as a plausibility result: the construction of a signature scheme from an
arbitrary one-way function is relatively very inefficient. To address this issue, we note that
reasonably practical constructions are known for pseudorandom generators, symmetric-key
encryption schemes, and signature schemes from one-way permutations [7, 8]. Thus, even
restricting to reasonably practical schemes, the class sc-AKE still requires the assumption
of a primitive possessing a trapdoor property, as far as we know.
13
predicates easily imply one-way functions [8], whereas the converse is be-
lieved not to be true. As some evidence for this, we note that it has been
shown in Ref. [12] that, with respect to black box reductions (and with
respect to a classical universe), one-way functions are not sufficient (even)
to imply secret key agreement (see Remark 2; but we have not checked that
this theorem holds with respect to a quantum universe—in general, such
classical black-box no-go theorems need not). Secondly, using the equiva-
lences stated in Theorem 9 and Theorem 10, it seems far more likely that an
efficient algorithm would be found for breaking a public-key cryptosystem
(i.e. computing a trapdoor predicate) than breaking a symmetric-key cryp-
tosystem (i.e. inverting a one-way function without the trapdoor property),
because the public-key cryptosystem possesses more structure in order to
embed a trapdoor into the encryption “function”. Quantum computers are
firmly believed not to be able to invert all one-way functions efficiently; we
state this as a conjecture:
Conjecture 15 (One-way functions exist). Quantum-resistant one-way func-
tions (computable in polynomial-time on a classical computer) exist.
We do not mean to suggest that quantum-resistant trapdoor predicates do
not exist (we don’t know). We do suggest, though, that the added structure
of trapdoor predicates makes it much more likely that algorithms for the
underlying problems will improve at a more unpredictable rate: plain one-
way functions are less risky.
Even allowing one-way functions, we see that qke has advantages over
classical systems, beyond unconditional security.
Advantages of QKE assuming (only) one-way functions. Most of
the advantages below have appeared elsewhere in the literature in one form
or another, but our presentation is motivated differently. The following
four advantages are not intended to be totally independent; indeed, each
is just a qualitatively different consequence of the fact that the secret key
is independent of both the initial keys and classical communication in qke
(and that we have taken sc-AKE-protocols out of the picture).
• Advantage 1: Improved security against reveal of initial keys
In classical cryptography, the physical nature of a cryptosystem and
protocol leads to the consideration of different types of attacks, some more
serious or more technologically difficult to mount than others. Similarly,
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adversaries are often categorized by their power, for example, passive adver-
saries are considered only to be able to read certain data that is sent along
a channel, whereas active adversaries are assumed to have complete control
over the channel. It is also relevant to consider precisely when Eve may
become active; a delayed adversary is one that remains passive until the key
establishment protocol completes, but is active immediately afterwards.
The physical nature of a qke system leads to the consideration of new
kinds of attacks and adversaries. Because of the two different channels used,
Eve can now operate differently on these two channels.13 Thus an adversary
can be defined by whether it is passive, delayed, or active on the classical and
quantum channels respectively; e.g., (p,p) means “passive on both channels”
and (a,d) means “active on the classical channel and delayed on the quantum
channel”.
With these terms in place, Table 3 shows how q-AKE-protocols have
advantages over the other classical protocols that also assume (at most) one-
way functions, for certain types of adversary; the table indicates whether
secure key can be established when the initial keys have been revealed. For
any situation where an immediate active attack is not deployed for whatever
reason (e.g. not technologically feasible, or not a high priority at the time), a
passive adversary who knows the initial keys loses the ability to compromise
the secret key later should she become an active attacker later. Note that if
“sc-AKE” appeared in the leftmost column of the table, the corresponding
row of “yes”/“no” values would look the same as the row corresponding to
the class q-AKE.
Note that, in order to break a q-AKE-protocol—or, more precisely, break
the cryptosystem that comprises the q-AKE-protocol—Eve, knowing all the
initial keys, can mount an active and sustained “man-in-the-middle” attack;
furthermore, for a q-AKEsym-system, the active attack must occur during the
first instance of the protocol (as any subsequent instance will use different
and independent initial keys). In large networks, this may pose a consider-
able challenge for Eve, depending on when she learns the initial keys and
whether the connections among users are fixed or ad-hoc.
Remark 16 (Perfect forward secrecy). Note that Advantage 1 is different
from perfect forward secrecy, a much weaker notion referring to whether
secret keys established in past sessions (with old initial keys no longer stored
on Alice and Bob) are secure once current initial keys are revealed. While q-
13We define “passive” on the quantum channel to mean having no access, since it is
difficult to formulate a definition of “read only” for a quantum channel. Measurement,
which seems necessary for reading, is an active process.
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(p,p) (d,d) (a,p) (a,d) (a,a)
OOB no no no no no
PGE no no no no no
wc-AKE no no no no no
q-AKE yes yes yes yes no
Table 3: Security against reveal of initial keys. The entries (yes/no) of the
chart indicate whether the secret key generated from the key establishment
protocol is secure under the reveal of either Alice’s or Bob’s initial key for
the given adversary (see the main text for an explanation of the notation
used to define the adversaries). The class sc-AKE does not appear, since we
are not assuming trapdoor predicates (and there is no known sc-AKE-scheme
that does not imply trapdoor predicates).
AKE-protocols certainly have perfect forward secrecy, Bernstein [5] has noted
that well-implemented PGE-protocols do, too.
• Advantage 2: Reduced dependence on out-of-band actions
Because a q-AKEsym-protocol generates secret key that is independent of
the initial keys and the classical communication, initial keys can be smaller
in the q-AKEsym-protocol than in an OOB-protocol, i.e., less initial entropy
is needed to prime the system. Also, a q-AKEsym-system may require fewer
subsequent out-of-band actions for refreshing initial keys, compared to PGE-
and wc-AKE-systems (at the very least because the latter are more vulner-
able to initial-key-reveal attacks—see above).
• Advantage 3: Reduced dependence on trusted third parties
In a network, key establishment can be done in a mediated fashion, via a
trusted key distribution centre, whose job is to give session keys to Alice and
Bob so that they may communicate securely. As part of the setup, every user
in the network, including Alice and Bob, shares an initial key (established
out of band) with the key distribution centre; in principle, these initial keys
may be asymmetric or symmetric. An example of such a system is Kerberos,
where the initial keys are symmetric, and, upon request by either Alice or
Bob, the key distribution centre generates a symmetric key and sends it
(encrypted using the initial keys) to Alice and Bob, who then use it to
encrypt and decrypt messages between each other.
Quantum key establishment may also be done in a mediated fashion,
so that the channels connecting Alice to Bob go through a key distribution
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centre, which gives Alice and Bob a session key to be used as a symmetric
initial key in a q-AKEsym-protocol.
If trapdoor predicates are not assumed to exist, then any classical me-
diated key establishment system must use symmetric initial keys; this is
because the key distribution centre must send keys to Alice and Bob, and
these keys must be, at least partially, encrypted (assuming the key distri-
bution centre is not to play an active part in the communication between
Alice and Bob). Similarly, the session keys must be symmetric keys, too.
Comparing any classical mediated key establishment system to one where
Alice and Bob use their symmetric session keys as initial keys in a q-AKEsym-
protocol, we see that, in the quantum case, Alice and Bob do not need to
trust the key distribution centre after their key establishment protocol is
complete. By contrast, in the classical case, the key distribution centre
must always be trusted, since it knows the keys that Alice and Bob use
to communicate securely. As well, Alice and Bob may be able to decouple
themselves completely from the key distribution centre after their first q-
AKEsym-session. Thus, any compromise of the key distribution centre after
the first q-AKEsym-session does not necessarily affect Alice and Bob.
• Advantage 4: Long-term security from short-term security
The secret key generated by any q-AKE-protocol will be information-
theoretically secure even if the authentication algorithm is broken in the
short term—as long as the break occurs after the key establishment proto-
col is completed. We may refer to this as “conditional information-theoretic
security”. This allows for the use of authentication algorithms that are per-
haps less secure in the long term but are easier to manage with regard to
initial keys, i.e., public-key algorithms. Note that any q-AKEpub-system has
the extra advantage over a q-AKEsym-system that it is less susceptible to
running out of authentication key due to noise or eavesdropping, because
there is no practical limit on how many classical messages may be authen-
ticated. In other words, using public-key authentication guards against at
least one type of denial-of-service attack.
Also, Alice and Bob may not need to rely on the same type of authentica-
tion used for the first q-AKE-session for subsequent q-AKE-sessions, i.e., for
the first session, Alice and Bob may execute a q-AKEpub-protocol, but, for
all subsequent sessions (in principle, i.e., in the absence of sufficiently heavy
adversarial action or noise), they may execute a q-AKEsym-protocol. Two
potential advantages of such a two-phase system are that (1) subsequent key
establishment sessions may run faster (since the symmetric-key algorithms
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may be more efficient than public-key algorithms for the required level of
security) and (2) subsequent key establishment sessions may not need to
rely on any computational assumptions.
If quantum computers can be assumed not to exist in the short term, i.e.,
for the service-lifetime of the public keys, then one can even use public-key
signature schemes whose security relies on the assumption of hardness of
factoring and the discrete logarithm problem for classical computers.
We believe that its ability to derive long-term from short-term security,
also known as everlasting security,14 may be the most attractive aspect of
qke systems from a security perspective.
The baby... The advent of public-key cryptography revolutionized secure
telecommunications, by vastly simplifying the problems of key distribution
and key management: Alice and Bob no longer needed to pre-share a sym-
metric key. Instead, Alice could publish her own public key, and that would
be sufficient for her to receive encrypted messages from anyone who got a
hold of it.
Of course, “publishing” a public key is easier said than done, but public-
key cryptography helps solve this problem, too. A signature scheme can
be used in conjunction with a network of trusted third parties to help Bob
be certain that he has Alice’s legitimate public key.15 This is probably the
reason Rivest [31] wrote, “The notion of a digital signature may prove to be
one of the most fundamental and useful inventions of modern cryptography.”
...the bathwater. There is a price to pay for the advantages of a public-
key infrastructure. Security necessarily depends on assumptions about the
hardness of certain mathematical problems; proofs that such problems are
actually hard seem to be beyond the reach of theoretical computer scientists.
14The term “everlasting security” has been used in the context of the bounded storage
model (see, e.g., Ref. [28]), where, e.g., it describes the case where encryption is secure
even if the adversary, at some later time, learns the pre-shared symmetric key, as long as,
at the time of transmission of the ciphertext, the adversary has bounded storage capability
(see Ref. [29]). The term seems equally well suited to qke.
15On the Internet, this works as follows. Bob’s web-browser comes from the manufac-
turer pre-loaded with the public key of a trusted third party Charlie. When Bob wants to
communicate with Alice, she shows Bob a certificate which contains her purported public
key and Charlie’s signature of the certificate, which also contains Alice’s name (and other
uniquely identifying and publicly-agreed-upon details about Alice). Bob checks that Al-
ice’s public key is valid by verifying Charlie’s signature using the pre-loaded public key.
In this context, signature schemes are said to offer “manageable persistence” (via digital
signature) of the binding of a name and a key [30].
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After Peter Shor discovered an efficient quantum algorithm for factoring
and computing discrete logarithms in 1994, qke protocols, the earliest of
which dates back to 1984, received renewed interest. Most literature on qke
that appeared in the 1990s and early 2000s focussed on protocols in the class
q-AKEsym. And rightfully so: it is remarkable that symmetric initial keys can
be expanded into much larger, independent, and information-theoretically
secure secret keys in band by exploiting quantum mechanics. As such, these
articles, through their reference to Shor’s discovery, may have been seen as
suggesting that all computational assumptions should be jettisoned at the
earliest opportunity—for who knew what problems might next succumb to
the power of a quantum computer?
A new spin on quantum cryptography. It was known (though perhaps
not widely) that insisting on unconditional security was not the only way
forward in order to ensure reasonable security against quantum attacks. It
was evident that public-key signature schemes could be used to authenticate
the classical channel in a qke protocol, and that such a system would have
some attractive features; this idea first appeared in the literature in Ref. [2].
Indeed, in light of Theorem 12 and Table 2, and assuming Conjecture 15 is
true, this idea becomes rather more striking:
• Quantum cryptography is the only known way to achieve (quantum-
resistant) private communication in a public-key infrastructure with
the minimal computational assumptions.
(If in addition Conjecture 14 is true, then the word “known” can be dropped.)
In other words, with some abuse of the metaphor, quantum cryptography
potentially allows us to throw out some of the bathwater—i.e., primitives
with a trapdoor property—while keeping most of the baby—i.e., authenti-
cated encryption without symmetric initial keys—and no classical scheme
is known to accomplish this. At the very least, quantum cryptography cer-
tainly allows us to sidestep the question of the necessity of trapdoor predi-
cates for secret key agreement (or trapdoor functions for trapdoor predicates
[32]). We view this as strengthening the case for signed qke.
If public-key encryption exists... If trapdoor predicates do exist and
are secure in the long term, we note that Advantages 1 through 4 can var-
iously be achieved by sc-AKE-protocols to at least some degree. However,
in this case, qke protocols may have other advantages over classical ones.
Because the secret key s generated in a q-AKE-protocol is independent of the
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classical communication c, there is no mathematical way to connect these
two quantities or—attribute—the secret key to Alice’s and Bob’s publicly
readable discussion; we say that the secret key is nonattributable.16
There are two ways in which a secret key may be considered attributable:
it is attributable to Alice’s and Bob’s public discussion (through its depen-
dence on the classical communication) and it is attributable to Alice and/or
Bob (because they participated in the classical communication). For the
former way, we just use the term attributable to describe the secret key; for
the latter way, we say the secret key is party-attributable. If the classical
communication is authenticated via a signature scheme, then the secret key
may be party-attributable in a provable way, or provably party-attributable.
If the secret key is subsequently used in an encryption scheme to encrypt
a plaintext, then we say that the plaintext is (party- or provably party-)
attributable whenever the secret key is.
Because q-AKE-protocols do not produce an attributable secret key, a q-
AKEpub-protocol may be used in composition with a one-time pad encryption
scheme, and then the secret key (and hence the plaintext) would never be
attributable. No totally classical scheme can achieve the same thing, i.e.,
non-party-attributable, public-key, secure communication.
For symmetric-key ciphers where the bit-length of the secret key is much
smaller than the bit-length the message (e.g., aes), the cipher itself provides
a subroutine for recognizing the secret key (i.e., if a candidate secret key s′
decrypts the ciphertext to something sensible, then with high probability s′
equals the actual secret key). If the secret key was produced by a sc-AKEpub-
protocol, then the secret key (and hence the plaintext) are provably party-
attributable given the secret key; however, if the secret key was produced
by a q-AKEpub-protocol, it is not attributable at all. This is a potential
advantage of using qke to generate aes keys.
16In Ref. [33], Beaver discusses “deniability” (see Refs [34, 35]) of qke, which is similar
to nonattributability. However, in that paper, it is assumed that Alice and Bob keep a
record of their qubit-measurement outcomes (often called “raw key bits”) made during the
protocol and that, if Alice and Bob are to deny that a particular secret key was established,
this record must be consistent with any measurements made by an eavesdropper, i.e.,
someone who is forcing Alice or Bob to reveal the secret key (or the plaintext encrypted
by it). We assume that Alice and Bob do not keep such records and that it is sufficient that
the forcer cannot provide evidence that attributes a particular secret key to the classical
communication; any measurement on the quantum channel that the forcer made is not
publicly verifiable, so we do not view its outcome as part of the public record. In other
words, in our model, Alice and Bob need not provide evidence to support their (tacit)
denial. Incidentally, Beaver concludes that the standard qke protocols do not provide
deniability in his model.
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Closing Remarks. Recall the objections to qke that we listed earlier
(see Page 2). We have addressed Objection 4 early on, by highlighting the
fundamental distinction between in-band and out-of-band key establishment
protocols. We believe there exist (or will exist) applications where in-band
generation of entropy is desirable.
Objections 2 and 3 both propose using (potentially very long) symmetric
initial keys in OOB or PGE protocols. We have presented a considerable list
of advantages that qke has over these protocols.
Objection 1 is the strongest one, but it relies on the computational as-
sumption of a trapdoor predicate, which (until any lower bounds are proven)
incurs risk when public-key encryption is used for long-term secrets. The
field of quantum algorithms is still relatively young, so it is probably unwise
to assume any particular candidate trapdoor predicate with a particular set
of parameters is secure (the recent discovery of a subexponential-time quan-
tum algorithm for elliptic curve isogenies supports this perspective [36]).
However, in addition to these standard counter-arguments for Objection
1, we have shown that qke may offer the benefit of nonattributability in
scenarios where no purely classical scheme can. We also note that it is con-
ceivable that, in the future, a q-AKE-system may be more efficient (i.e. have
a higher secret key rate) than a sc-AKE-system, as public-key encryption
is known to be rather slow. As well, q-AKE-systems may be more cost-
effectively resistant to side-channel attacks, which are notoriously difficult
to defend against in the classical world.
The debate on the merits of qke may have suffered from a focus on
unconditional security, which may have given the impression that it is of no
value to practical cryptography. The message from classical cryptographers
has been loud and clear: the pre-sharing of symmetric keys is costly and thus
to be avoided in the majority of key-establishment applications: e.g., Pater-
son et al. [2] wrote, “[Quantum key establishment], when unconditionally
secure, does not solve the problem of key distribution. Rather, it exacer-
bates it, by making the pre-establishment of symmetric keys a requirement.”
They also wrote, “It is likely that using [qke] with public key authentica-
tion [...] has security benefits [...]. However, [qke] loses much of its appeal
in [this setting], as the overall system security is no longer guaranteed by
the laws of quantum physics alone.” Our article is completely in accordance
with the former comment and, with regard to the latter comment, expands
on the “benefits” of signed qke in order to bolster its “appeal”. As such, we
hope to have firmed up the middle ground between unconditionally-secure
qke and computationally-secure classical key establishment in the “quan-
tum debate”.
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